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IMPLEMENTING AGRICULTURAL
PRESERVATION PROGRAMS: A TIME TO
CONSIDER SOME RADICAL APPROACHES?
Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer*
Nationally, the controversy rages over the issue of whether the
farmland conversion syndrome has reached crisis proportions or
has been greatly exaggerated.1 In many areas of the country, the
future need for farmland preservation may be long range or even
non-existent since overproduction rather than shortage poses the
most imminent threat to many sectors of American agriculture.2 In
some areas, however, the crisis has occurred, time has already run
out, and most current farmland preservation approaches are inade-
quate and meaningless. New approaches and concepts are
necessary.
* B.A., Duke University; J.D., Duke University; Professor of Law and Co-Director of
the Center of Agricultural Law, University of Florida. I especially would like to thank Alan
Armour, my research assistant, for his dedication and help in the preparation of this
presentation.
1. No other area of agricultural law has been as widely written and published upon.
For broader treatments of the subject, see C. LITrLE, LAND AND FOOD: THE PRESERVATION OF
U.S. FARMLAND, AMERICAN LAND FORUM (Washington 1979); M. COTNER, Land Use Policy
and Agriculture: A State and Local Perspective, U.S. DEPT. OF AG. ECONOMIC RESECH
SERVICE (Washington 1974); E. ROBERTS, THE LAW AND THE PRESERVATION OF AGRICULTURAL
LAND (1982); URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, Has the "Farmland Crisis" Been Overstated?: Recom-
mendations for Balancing Urban and Agricultural Land Needs, 1983 ZONING AND PLANNING
LAW HANDBOOK 235, 266 (Strom ed. 1983); URSBAN LAW INSTITUTE: ENVIRONMENTAL COM-
MENT, Preservation of Prime Agricultural Land (Washington, Jan. 1978); Baden. Agricul-
tural Land Preservation: Threshing the Wheat From the Chaff, INST. ON PLAN. ZONING &
EMINENT DOMAIN 171 (1983); Fischel, The Urbanization of Agricultural Land: A Review of
the National Agricultural Lands Study, 58 LAND ECON. 236 (1982); Freilich, Saving the
Land: The Utilization of Modern Techniques of Growth Management to Preserve Rural
and Agricultural America, 13 URB. LAW 27 (1981); Glenn, La Protection du Territoire
Agricole au Quebec, 11 GENERALE DE DROIT 209 (1980); Hand, Right-to-Farm Laws: Break-
ing New Ground in the Preservation of Farmland, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 289 (1984); Juergen-
smeyer, Farmland Preservation: A Vital Agricultural Law Issue for the 1980's, 21 WASH-
BURN L.J. 443 (1982); Keene, Agricultural Land Preservation: Legal and Constitutional
Issues, 15 GONZ. L. REV. 621 (1980).
2. URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, Has the "Farmland Crisis" Been Overstated?: Recommen-
dations for Balancing Urban and Agricultural Land Needs, 1983 ZONING & PLAN. LAW
HANDBOOK, 235, 266 (Strom ed. 1983).
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The crisis analysis certainly seems appropriate at the current
time in the northern portion of the Florida citrus belt. The virtu-
ally unprecedented freeze of December 1983, the outbreak of citrus
canker in 1984, and another precedent setting freeze in some areas
in early 1985, has left the future agricultural status of thousands of
acres of land in grave doubt. Many of these acres, which have been
devoted to profitable citrus production for many years, are now ex-
periencing the devastating effects of the farmland conversion
syndrome.3
The spector of citrus trees being sacrificed to bulldozers and
the infestation of condominiums or retirement housing is by no
means new in the northern half of the Florida citrus belt. Nonethe-
less, the relative prosperity of the citrus industry4 had made agri-
cultural use of land an economically viable alternative to urban
sprawl until the past few months. Now, with the large scale de-
struction of citrus groves by freeze and disease, countless grove
owners find land development much more appealing than replant-
ing. If farmland preservation is ever to be a meaningful concept to
prevent the conversion of vast areas of groveland to non-agricul-
tural uses, there must be an immediate and perhaps drastic re-
3. It is estimated that 120,000 acres of citrus were destroyed in the December 1983
freeze. The estimated direct economic loss to the citrus industry due to the December 1983
freeze exceeds $1.5 billion. The acreage destroyed amounts to 13.59% of Florida's citrus
land. For a detailed breakdown and analysis on the future agricultural impact of the above
figures, see CENTRAL FLORIDA FREEZE RECOVERY TASK FORCE - Final Report, Institute of
Food and Agricultural Sciences, University of Florida (1984). In 1984, the State of Florida
burned and destroyed seven million young citrus trees in an effort to eradicate the citrus
canker. The citrus industry has spent more than $13 million in its efforts to eradicate the
citrus canker. See, e.g., Winter Freezes Drive Citrus Growers South, Gainesville (Fla.) Sun,
Mar. 26, 1985, at 8B, col. 1; Senators Say State has Done Too Little to Eradicate Canker,
Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, April 1985, at 12A, col. 1. Although the destruction reports on the
1985 freeze have not yet been compiled, Ben Hill Griffin, Jr., Chairman of the Florida Citrus
Commission, has indicated that the 1985 freeze will rival the December 1983 freeze. See,
"Citrus Can Compete If Growers Emphasize Quality Over Quantity," Florida Trend, at 68
(April 1985).
4. Florida has consistently dominated the nation's citrus production. Florida typically
crops roughly 70 percent of the nation's citrus production. See FLORIDA CROP AND LIVESTOCK
REPORTING SERVICE, Florida Agricultural Statistics, Citrus Summary 1984, It 4-5. The five-
year (1979-84) average return for central Florida orange groves was $1,243.38 per acre.
Budgeting Costs and Return: Central Florida Citrus Production 1983-84, INSTITUTE OF
FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA (June 1984); The five-year (1979-
84) average return for Indian River (Fla.) white seedless grapefruit was $662.78 per acre.
Budgeting Costs and Return: Indian River Citrus Production 1983-84, INSTITUTE OF FOOD
AND AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA (June 1984).
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sponse. Central Florida does not have time to argue over the crisis
analysis. The crisis is at hand. This crisis will likely provide an
immediate testing ground for farmland preservation programs.
Consequently, potential responses to the crisis should be of partic-
ular importance to all of those interested in farmland preservation
throughout the nation. In short, precedent helpful to other juris-
dictions could be in the making in Florida.
This presentation offers a proposal that could provide a mean-
ingful framework for tailoring a farmland preservation program to
respond to the Florida crisis. The legal framework for various
farmland preservation programs is explored elsewhere in this collo-
quium;5 and the author has expressed his view on several previous
occasions. This presentation will therefore concentrate on the for-
mulation and implementation of farmland programs and on a
somewhat novel approach - a farmland preservation impact fee.
A. Formulating an Agricultural Lands Preservation Program:
The Trinity.
Once a unit of government decides to embark upon a farmland
preservation program, three key disciplines and the professionals
who practice them should be identified and interrelated. The three
disciplines are planning, economics, and law. Many existing pro-
grams suffer from the absence or inadequate involvement of one or
even two of these disciplines.
The importance of planning and planners to the successful
and proper formulation of a farmland preservation program is con-
ceptually obvious. At the dawn of the land use control era, the
courts and model statutes recognized as a self-evident principle
that zoning and other land use regulatory power must be exercised
to implement a comprehensive land use plan.7 One of the greatest
5. See J. WADLEY, Farmland Preservation, 20 Gonz. L. Rev. 683 (1985). See also, infra
notes 23-51 and accompanying text.
6. See 1 J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, AGRICULTURAL LAW Ch. 4 (1982); Juergen-
smeyer, Farmland Preservation: A Vital Law Issue for the 1980's, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 443
(1982); Juergensmeyer, Iatroduction: State and Local Land Use* Planning and Control in
the Agricultural Context, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 463 (1980); Juergensmeyer & Wershow,
Agriculture and Changing Legal Concepts in an Urbanizing Society, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 78
(1975).
7. The requirements of a comprehensive plan were contained in ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON ZONING, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (Washington
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tragedies of land use control law was the permissiveness of courts
to recognize mere zoning maps as satisfaction of the comprehensive
plan requirement. Even today, in only a few states are there
mandatory planning requirements for those units of local govern-
ment which exercise the land use control power.8 Fortunately,
Florida is one of those jurisdictions.
The Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act 9 man-
dates comprehensive planning by Florida's local governments. This
Act requires a future land use plan element, designating proposed
future general distribution and the location and extent of various
land uses, including agricultural use. 10 The Act further requires a
recreation and open space element, indicating a comprehensive
system of public and private recreation sites.11
The planning element of any agricultural land preservation
program in Florida is therefore grounded in statutory law.12 In
states without the legal requirement for planning, common sense
dictates considerable involvement of planners. How else could the
agricultural land use be coordinated with other present and pro-
jected land use policies? Nothing could guarantee the quicker de-
mise of a preservation program than to find agricultural land des-
ignated for preservation also designated for housing development
or planned as the location of a new transportation route.
rev. ed. 1926). See generally Curtis v. City of Los Angeles, 156 P. 462 (Cal. 1916); Mayor &
Council of Wilmington v. Turk, 129 A. 512 (Del. Ch. 1925); State ex rel. Henry v. City of
Miami, 158 So. 82 (Fla. 1934). For the seminal discussion in this area, see Haas, In Accor-
dance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955). Holmgren v. City of Lin-
coln, 199 Neb. 178, 256 N.W.2d 686 (1977) ("A comprehensive plan is a guide to community
development . . ."); Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 893 (1968) ("... the
comprehensive plan is the essence of zoning. Without it, there can be no rational allocation
of land use."); Hunt v. City of San Antonio, 462 S.W.2d 536, 540 (Tex. 1971) ("If the zoned
area may be encroached upon from the edge, the effect is to cause the comprehensive plan
to collapse ... ).
8. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65300 (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. § 163.3161 (1983);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § § 67-6508 and 67-6511 (1980); VA. CODE § 15.1-446.1 (1981).
9. FLA. STAT. § § 163.3161, and 163.3211 (1983). On or before July 1, 1979, each county
and each municipality in the state was required to prepare and adopt a comprehensive plan.
FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(2) (1977). For a general discussion on the Act, see 1 J. JUERGENSMEYER
& J. WADLEY, FLORIDA LAND USE RESTRICTIONS § 4.04 (1979). See also T. PELHAM, State
Land-Use Planning and Regulation (1979).
10. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a) (1983).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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The second discipline, agricultural economics, has been a
respected discipline for several decades, but the use of economic
analysis in land use planning in general, and farmland preservation
programs in particular, is sorely lacking. Although many socio-eco-
nomic and demographic factors affect the decision of landowners
to keep their land in agricultural production or to convert it to
non-agricultural uses, the economic factor is frequently the key."3
It takes a very strong love of the soil to keep land in farming when
its development value is 1,800% more than its farm value. 4 If a
farmland preservation program is to be acceptable to farmers and
have a chance of success, the program must be designed on the
basis of economic analysis that makes farming the land in the fu-
ture economically feasible. If the farmland preservation program is
mandatory, the agricultural use of the land must be economically
feasible or the taking issue will be raised and used to invalidate the
program on principles of unconstitutionality. 5 Intricate and so-
phisticated economic studies-not just estimates of value by a real
estate appraiser-should be one of the initial steps in the formula-
tion of a farmland preservation program.16
The third participant in the formulation of a preservation pro-
gram is the lawyer. The lawyer is perhaps the program's least im-
portant participant as compared to the vital roles that land use
planners and economists play in formulating and implementing
farmland preservation programs. However, because farmland pres-
ervation law is at best a murky field, careful legal drafting is essen-
tial. This is particularly true when it comes to defending the pro-
gram from the ever present ogre of the taking issue.1 7
13, Healy & Short, New Forces in the Market for Rural Land, 46 APPRAISAL J. 185,
190 (April 1978). See also Newton & Boast, Preservation by Contract: Public Purchase of
Development Rights in Farmland, 4 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 195-196 (1978).
14. Supra note 13. For a more detailed discussion on the socio-economic and demo-
graphic factors affecting farmland conversion, see 1 J. JUERGENSMEYER AND J. WADLEY, AGRI-
CULTURAL LAW § 4.1 (1982).
15. Freilich, Saving the Land: The Utilization of Modern Techniques of Growth
Management to Preserve Rural and Agricultural American, 13 URB. L. 27, 31 (1981).
16. Torres, Helping Farmers and Saving Farmland, 37 OKrA L. REV., 31 (1984). The
author suggests the use of transferable development rights as a possible solution to compen-
sate the farmer for loss of his property's development value. See also Freilich, supra note
15, at 42-43.
17. For a leading discussion on the taking issue, see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J.
BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973). See also infra notes 28-51 and accompanying text.
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Once the farmland preservation program is formulated, the
lawyer's role in drafting statutes and/or local government ordi-
nances that effectuate the program's goals and policies becomes a
key factor. Comprehensive plans must be reformulated or amended
at state, regional, and local government levels to incorporate the
program. The farmland preservation programs should be inte-
grated so as to complement, rather than contradict, existing agri-
cultural policies and land use regulations that affect agriculture. It
is necessary that administrative machinery be established or iden-
tified to administer the day-to-day operation of the farmland pres-
ervation program.
The failure - or limited success - that most existing farmland
preservation programs have encountered results from poor or inad-
equate planning, economic analysis, and legal resourcefulness.
Identifying and anticipating the problems which farmland preser-
vation programs will encounter is an essential ingredient for the
successful implementation of any program.
B. The Issue of Compensating Landowners
The key obstacle to a program's successful implementation is
the real or perceived economic threat to property values and the
potential cost to the enacting government unit commonly associ-
ated with farmland preservation programs. If a landowner receives
no compensation for a land use restriction which limits his land to
agricultural uses only, his economic survival may be threatened.
Furthermore, the farmland preservation program itself may be
threatened by landowner opposition. If the landowner is compen-
sated for his loss in economic value, the governmental unit's
budget, which would bear the economic burden of compensation,
may be threatened. Consequently, the farmland preservation pro-
gram may never be implemented because the governmental entity
is unable or unwilling to expend the funds to implement the pres-
ervation program. Is there a way out of this dilemma?
Thus far it has been assumed that there will be a meaningful
economic loss in value if farmland is "protected" from being con-
verted to non-agricultural uses. In most instances-almost by defi-
nition-this will be the case. If farmland needs protection it is usu-
ally because there is development demand for the land in
[Vol. 20:701706
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question.1 8 If there is not, then even if the land goes out of agricul-
tural production, perhaps due to the death, retirement, or bank-
ruptcy e of the current farmer, it will remain available for agricul-
tural use in the future and, therefore, does not need a farmland
protection program. Consequently, the economic effect of most
farmland preservation programs will deprive the farmland of its
development potential value.
Farmland protection programs may have some economically
positive influences on land values that would alleviate or even can-
cel out the loss in value. Tax breaks could be worked into the pres-
ervation program that will increase the farmer's net profit. In addi-
tion, farmland may become more valuable when a program
guarantees that the parcel in question and the surrounding land
will remain in agricultural production thereby causing economies
of scale in regard to marketing and supply.2 0 The same economic
effect may result from the protection that farmland will receive
from the potential imposition of liability under a possible nuisance
action brought by encroaching urban developers or residents.21
In short, the institution of a farmland protection program is
not entirely and inevitably negative as far as the economic value of
the subject farmland is concerned. Nonetheless, in many, if not
most, instances there will be a significant decrease in the land's
fair market value if the real or hypothesized highest and best use
of the property is for development rather than agricultural pur-
poses. The critical question therefore is must the governmental en-
tity agree to compensate the landowner or risk a judicial declara-
tion of unconstitutional invalidity on the theory that the farmland
preservation program constitutes a taking of property without just
compensation? Additionally, if there is not a taking, should the
18. See supra note 13.
19. Total farm debt outstanding in the United States has risen from approximately
$11.2 billion in 1959 to more than $216 billion in 1983. U.S.D.K_, Outlook and Situation,
Table 5 (1983). Accompanying this increase in the use of credit has been a corresponding
increase in the number of bankruptcies filed. Farm Credit Administration Agricultural and
Credit Outlook '83, at 18-24 (1983). For a general discussion on agricultural debt problems,
see Harl, Problems of Debt in Agriculture, 6 J. AGRIc. TAX'N & L. (1985).
20. Healy & Shurt, New Forces in the Market for Rural Land, 46 APPRAISAL J. 190
(April 1978).
21. For a general discussion on agricultural nuisance liability, see 2 J. JUERGENSMEYER
& J. WADLEY, AGRICULTURAL LAW Ch. 25 (1982).
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landowner be compensated?
This author believes there is usually not a taking of property
without just compensation. If the land retains meaningful eco-
nomic value, then a decrease in fair market value - if considerable -
should not constitute a "taking" as courts currently apply that
concept. The taking issue and property law concepts are discussed
at length elsewhere in this colloquium and the basics will not be
reviewed here.22 Instead, this author will simply state his analysis
of the current state of the law and how the law on point should
develop.
In spite of the unsettled state of the law, judicial decisions
have slowly moved away from nineteenth century tort law descrip-
tions of real property rights that focus upon "rights".23 Gone, or at
least under attack, is the idea that real property ownership should
be defined in terms stating that a man can do anything he wishes
with his property subject to tort liability if he causes damage to
another persons land. What is being adopted is Professor Leon
Duguit's legal sociology concept of property rights, usually labelled
the social function theory of ownership. This theory suggests that
land ownership serves a social function and that ownership rights
are relative, not absolute, and are defined so as to accomplish soci-
etal interests.2
A legal historian, however, would argue that adoption of the
social function theory of ownership is not a movement toward a
new concept but a re-recognition of the ignored but never aban-
doned original common law concept of real property ownership. It
is true that our common law heritage has always conceptualized
real property ownership rights as a combination of privileges and
responsibilities related to the right to use land and not really own
22. See J. WADLEY, Farmland Preservation, 20 GON. L. REV. 683 (1985). See also, in-
fra notes 28-51 and accompanying text.
23. The social function theory of ownership basically negates the concept of absolute
private ownership of property. Ownership is not an absolute right but a right that is permit-
ted and protected to the extent it is consistent with the needs of society at a given time. See
Juergensmeyer, The American Legal System and Environmental Protection, 23 U. FLA. L.
REv. 439, 446-47 (1971).
24. The foundation of much of the common law of nuisances revolves around the
maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas." For an excellent judicial discussion of this
concept, see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
25. DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE (1919).
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it in the personal property sense.2' Professor Wadley's presenta-
tion also discusses these ownership concepts 7 so only the key
statements of the leading cases and commentaries which express
the social function theory will be presented here.
In the landmark case, of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2 8
Justice Holmes clearly recognized that at times individual property
rights must yield to societal interests. This decision was the touch-
stone of all subsequent "taking" law. At issue was whether a stat-
ute that forbade mining methods, removing supports and causing
subsidence of homes erected above the mine, constituted a tak-
ing.29 In holding that the statute did constitute a taking, Justice
Homes acutely recognized:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an
implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the
implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due process
clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is
the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in
most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act.3 0
Thus, in Justice Holmes' view, the distinction between a valid ex-
ercise of the police power and a taking was a difference of degree
not kind. s
Shortly after the Pennsylvania Coal Co. decision, the United
States Supreme Court decided the leading zoning case of Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.3 2 where the Court upheld the validity
of comprehensive zoning ordinances in general. The Euclid Court
26. For a broad discussion on the history of the social function theory of ownership,
see the mimeographed but unpublished lectures of Professor M.E. Kadem of the University
of Geneva, prepared for the Faculte International pour l'Enseignement du Droit Compare.
Professor Kadem, in these lectures entitled La Notion et les Limities de la Propriete Privee
en Droit Compare, dates the acceptance of the social function theory of ownership in the
United States from the enactment of the major items of New Deal legislation.
27. See J. WADLEY, Farmland Preservation, 20 GONZ. L. REv. 683 (1985).
28. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
29. Id. at 412. This statute was commonly known as the Kohler Act. Id.
30. Id. at 413.
31. Id. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANrA, THE TAKING ISSuE (1973) for an
excellent discussion and analysis of Pennsylvania Coal and its impact on taking law.
32. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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implicitly adhered to the social function theory of ownership in ra-
tionalizing that the subject zoning ordinance, and all similar laws
and regulations
must find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted
for the public welfare. The line which in this field separates the legiti-
mate from the illegitimate assumption of power is not capable of precise
delimitation. It varies with circumstances and conditions. A regulatory
zoning ordinance, which would be clearly valid as applied to the great
cities, might be clearly invalid as applied to rural communities.3
The next leading case to express the social function theory was
United States v. Willow River Power Co.34 At issue was whether
the action of the United States in raising the water level of the St.
Croix River, which allegedly impaired the efficiency of the com-
pany's hydroelectric plant, constituted a compensable "taking" of
private property.35 The Court, in holding that the action did not
constitute a compensable taking, articulated:
not all economic interests are "property rights"; only those economic ad-
vantages are "rights" which have the law back of them, and only when
they are so recognized may courts compel others to forbear from interfer-
ing with them or to compensate for their invasion .... Such economic
uses are rights only when they are legally protected interests.3 6
Finally, in the landmark case of Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City3" the United States Supreme court, drawing
from more than fifty years of "taking" jurisprudence, carefully an-
alyzed current "taking" law.38 The question presented to the Court
was whether a city may restrict the development of historical
landmarks without effecting a "taking" requiring the payment of
33. Id. at 387.
34. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
35. Id. at 499-500. The Willow River Power Company alleged that the United States'
action was violative of the fifth amendment, which requires just compensation for the "tak-
ing" of private property for public use. Id. at 500.
36. Id. at 502-03.
37. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
38. The Court articulated a number of factors that should be considered when engag-
ing in the ad hoc taking analysis: (1) whether there is a physical invasion of the property; (2)
the degree to which there is a diminution in the value of the property; (3) whether the
regulation promotes the public health, safety, welfare, or morals; (4) the extent to which
investment-backed expectations are frustrated; and (5) whether the regulation promotes a
public benefit or prevents a public harm. Id. at 124-35.
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just compensation. 9 Specifically, the Court concluded that New
York City's Landmarks Preservation law did not constitute a tak-
ing of land occupied by Grand Central Terminal. 0
[T]he question of what constitutes a "taking" for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment has proved to be of considerable difficulty .... The Court,
quite simply, has been unable to develop any "set formula" for determin-
ing when "justice and fairness" require the economic injuries caused by
public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain
disproportionally concentrated on a few persons. Indeed, we have fre-
quently observed that whether a particular restriction will be rendered
invalid by the government's failure to pay for any losses proximately
caused by it depends largely "upon the particular circumstances [in
that]case."' 1
Two leading state court cases addressing the "taking" issue,
and further expressing the social function theory, are deserving of
discussion. In Just v. Marinette County,42 the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin upheld the constitutional validity of a shoreland zoning
ordinance designed to prevent the degradation and deterioration of
navigable waters and the public rights resulting from the uncon-
trolled use and development of shorelands." The ordinance pro-
hibited altering the natural character of land within certain dis-
tances from navigable waters." In so holding, the court recognized
that "[a]n owner of land has no absolute right to change the essen-
tial material character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for
which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the
right of others."' 5
In Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc.,46 the Florida Supreme
Court upheld the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commis-
sion's final order denying approval for the development of a sub-
stantial wetland area. The court, in suggesting that land ownership
serves a social function, cited to the above quote from Just4 7 and
stated that "[t]he owner of private property is not entitled to the
39. Id. at 107.
40. Id. at 138.
41. Id. at 123-24.
42. 201 N.W. 2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
43. Id. at 764-65.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 768.
46. 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 10 (1982).
47. Id. at 1382.
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highest and best use of his property if that use will create a public
harm. '48 Consequently, because of the environmentally sensitive
nature of wetlands, the court prohibited development of the area
since it would adversely impact the surrounding environment. 49
Lastly, in THE TAKING ISSUE, 50 a leading land use commentary,
the authors suggest:
the fear of the taking issue is stronger than the taking clause itself. It is
an American fable or myth that a man can use his land any way he
pleases regardless of his neighbors. The myth survives, indeed thrives,
even though unsupported by the pattern of court decisions. Thus, at-
tempts to resolve land use controversies must deal not only with the law,
but with the myth as well. 1
Even though the threat of the adoption of a concept of "regu-
latory taking" lingers in the brooding omnipresence of possible ju-
dicial decisions, the current law is, and in the opinion of the author
should continue to be, that compensation is not constitutionally
required when the conversion to non-agricultural use is forbidden
to owners of agricultural land, if a meaningful economic return on
the agricultural use value of the farmland "protected" by the pres-
ervation program is still possible.
This social function theory of ownership does not, however, in
any way preclude the desirability or even the political and eco-
nomic need to compensate farmers for economic loss due to farm-
land protection program restrictions. The current economic crisis
in the agricultural sector of the United States52 makes nearly all
farmers worthy recipients of nearly any imaginable largesse. The
economic mitigation of land use regulation has long been recog-
nized by land use control law scholars and attempted in several
countries.5 3
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1379.
50. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973).
51. Id. at 318-19.
52. All one has to do is pick up and read any newspaper or national magazine to learn
of the current economic crisis that the American farmer is experiencing.
53. J. COSTONIS & R. DEVoy, THE PUERTO RICAN PLAN: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
THROUGH DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFER (1975); D. HAGMAN, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS
(1972); See J. ROSE, THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS (1975); REGIONAL Sci. RE-
SOURCES INST., Untaxing Open Space: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Differential
Assessment of Farm and Open Space 23 (1976); Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive
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Why then do we argue about whether farmers must be com-
pensated for lost value when a farmland preservation program is
implemented? Is not the answer clear - most taxpayers do not
want their taxes raised (or existing government tax funded pro-
grams cut) to pay the cost.
Therefore, if one accepts the proposition that the most serious
obstacle to the successful implementation of farmland preservation
programs is the necessity or desirability of compensating farmers
for the decrease in value their land usually suffers when subjected
to a farmland preservation program, then the "solution" is to find
a satisfactory source for such funds.4
A landowner under a farmland protection program suffers
what is commonly referred to as a "wipeout." Public control of the
use of land generally has the effect of increasing or decreasing land
values. "Wipeouts" occur when the value of real property decreases
due to factors beyond the landowner's control, whereas "windfalls"
occur when real property value increases due to factors beyond the
landowner's control. Under a rational land-use control system, ide-
ally "windfalls" should equal "wipeouts."'55 Therefore, "windfalls"
must be recaptured to mitigate "wipeouts." How can we recapture
"windfalls" to compensate those farmers that have suffered
"wipeouts" due to farmland preservation programs? A possible an-
swer is to recapture the "windfalls" through impact fees imposed
on those segments of the economicy which cause the need for
farmland protection programs.
C. Proposal of a Novel Approach: An Agricultural Lands Preser-
vation Impact Fee
Thus far, impact fees have been used to solve or at least allevi-
ate the capital funding crunch local governments experience when
they must build roads, parks, schools, jails, and other capital facili-
Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HAiv. L. REv. 574 (1972). Professor
Hagman defined "wipeouts" as "any decrease in the value of real estate other than one
caused by the owner or by general deflation." Other countries utilizing windfall/wipeout
analysis in land use control regulation include Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Eng-
land. Keene, A Review of Governmental Policies and Techniques for Keeping Farmers
Farming, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 119 (1979).
54. See, e.g., Freilich, supra note 15, at 42-43; Torres, supra note 16.
55. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, IN WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE
AND COMPENSATION 5 (1978).
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ties to service new development. 6 The same factors which make
impact fees essential to local governments needing funds for capi-
tal facilities construction purposes arguably extend to the need for
funds by local governments to pay for farmland preservation pro-
grams. The same economic and legal underpinning also arguably
exists for park impact fees and farmland preservation impact fees.
Impact fees are land regulatory charges levied by governmen-
tal units against new development to generate revenue for capital
expenditures necessitated by the new development.57 Consider, for
example the need for parks and recreation areas. As new develop-
ment occurs, the need for open areas - parks and recreation areas -
increases because of the increase in population. Also, the availabil-
ity of such land decreases because some of the land formerly avail-
able for such use is now developed.
The concept of the impact fee is not new. The first land use
regulation designed to shift the capital expense burden to the de-
veloper and new residents was the required dedication. Local gov-
ernments conditioned their approval of a subdivision plat upon the
developer's agreement to provide and dedicate land for facilities
such as streets, schools, and parks. Required dedications for these
capital improvements is now a well accepted part of subdivision
regulation and is generally approved by the courts if reasonable in
area.
8
56. See, e.g., Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 685 (1981) (schools); City of Arvada v. City and County of Denver, 663 P.2d 611 (Colo.
1983) (water and sewer); P.W. Investments, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 655 P.2d 1365
(Colo. 1982) (parks); Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1983) (parks); Home Builders and Contractors Ass'n
v. Palm Beach County, 446 So. 2d 140 (Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 451 So. 2d 848 (Fla.
1983) (roads); Town of Longboat Key v. Lands End, Ltd., 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (parks); Contractors & Builders Association v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla.
1976) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979) (water and sewer); Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662
P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983) (water and sewer).
57. See generally Connelly, Road Impact Fees Upheld in Noncharter County, FLOR-
IA BAR J. (Jan. 1984); Jacobsen & Redding, Impact Taxes: Making Development Pay Its
Way, 55 N.C.L. REV. 407 (1977); Juergensmeyer and Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to
Local Governments' Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 FIA. ST. UL. REv. 415 (1981); O'Connell
and Schoech, Impact Fees: The Current State of the Law and Practice in Florida, 8 A.B.A.
PLANNING AND LAW DIVISION NEWSLETTER (1984).
58. See Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964)
(dedication for recreational purposes upheld); Arnett v. City of Mobile, 449 So. 2d 1222
(Ala. 1984) (dedication of right-of-way for future thoroughfare); Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan
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The "in lieu" fee developed as a refinement of required dedi-
cations." The "in lieu" fee substitutes a money payment for dedi-
cation of land when the governmental unit determines the latter is
not feasible. For example, to require each and every subdivision to
dedicate land for parks would not necessarily provide an accept-
able park system because the sites would often be inadequate in
size and unsatisfactorily located.
The impact fee is functionally and conceptually similar to the
in lieu fee in that both are required payments for capital outlays
necessitated by new development. The impact fee concept, how-
ever, is a much more flexible tool and is an important if not essen-
tial tool in monitoring land use regulation based on impact analy-
sis through linkage and mitigation devices.6 0
An impact fee for an agricultural lands preservation program
would be grounded in the following analysis. One of the key im-
pacts of new development is to convert agricultural lands to non-
agricultural uses and to place economic development pressure on
surrounding farmland. Consequently, the farmland's continued use
for agricultural purposes becomes economically questionable and
legally and practicably difficult because of the potential incompati-
bility of many agricultural uses with neighboring development.6
The loss of agricultural land and the impairment of the con-
tinuation of agricultural uses of other agricultural land deprives
the entire community, and the new development in particular, of
open spaces, potential and actual recreational areas, and environ-
Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (adopted the "rational nexus"
test for assessing the validity of required dedications under the police power). See also Hey-
man & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New
Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964); Howard
County v. JJM Inc., 482 A.2d 908 (Md. 1984) (right-of-way reservation).
59. See, e.g., Jenad Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966) (in lieu fee not a tax but a reasonable form of planning); Briar West,
Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 291 N.W.2d 730 (Neb. 1980) (in lieu fee for local street paving); Call
v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) (in lieu fee for flood control, park, and
recreational purposes upheld); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis.
1965) (upheld constitutionality of in lieu fees for educational and recreational purposes);
Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983) (in lieu park fee).
60. See Juergensmeyer and Blake, supra note 57. See also Juergensmeyer, Drafting
Impact Fees to Alleviate Florida's Pre-platted Lands Dilemma, 7 FLORIDA ENV'T & URR.
Issu s (April 1970).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 16-25.
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mentally protective land uses. Furthermore, the loss of and threat
to agricultural land adversely affects the food supply and related
economic bases of the community. Therefore, new development
should be required to pay at least a portion of the cost of preserv-
ing agricultural land endangered by that new development. The
new development will be directly benefited by the preservation
program, which will be funded by the impact fees collected from
the new development. In other words, the linkage between the new
development and the need for an agricultural lands preservation
program must be established. Such a connection should not be dif-
ficult to establish in Florida's frozen citrus groves as new develop-
ments spring into being.
The careful coordination of planning, economic analysis, and
legal analysis discussed earlier are essential if such an impact fee is
to be workable and legally defensible.' A review of the judicial ac-
ceptance of impact fees in Florida will illustrate the guidelines
which must be followed in the development of a farmland preser-
vation impact fee.
D. Judicial Acceptance of Impact Fees in Florida
The Florida Supreme Court in Contractors & Builders Associ-
ation of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin," held that a properly
restricted impact fee which shifts the burden of extra-development
capital expenditures to new residents need not be considered a tax.
The Builders Association attacked the validity of an impact fee for
sewer and water capital funding, claiming that the money collected
for capital improvements to the system was an invalid tax.6 In de-
feating this attack, the court indicated that the connection fees
bore a reasonable relationship to the costs of regulation." Further-
more, the avowed purpose of the ordinance was to raise money to
expand the water and sewer system, so as to accommodate the in-
creased demand created by additional connections to the system.66
In essence, the municipality was seeking to "shift to the user ex-
penses incurred on his account," since those who benefit from the
62. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
63. 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976); cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979).
64. Id. at 317.
65. Id. at 318.
66. Id.
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expansion should bear the cost of that expansion."' Because the
appropriate rational nexus had been established between the fee
charged and the capital costs of expansion necessitated by new
users, the impact fee was held not to be a tax.68
In so holding, the court recognized that the costs of expansion
and the timing of certain types of capital expenditures would be
difficult to identify precisely and stated that "perfection is not the
standard" of a city's duty in establishing a nexus between the fees
charged and the capital improvements required by the new users.6 9
The court further held, however, that the subject ordinance was
defective for failure to incorporate appropriate restrictions on the
use of the fees it collected. 0
The Florida Supreme Court's standard of reasonableness in
Dunedin seemingly utilizes a dual rational nexus test. The first ra-
tional nexus criterion is that the costs of expansion must be "suffi-
ciently attributable" to the fees charged and the capital improve-
ments necessitated by the new users. Secondly, the Dunedin
decision indicates that the court would require only a "sufficient
benefits" nexus between the fee charged and the capital improve-
ments which benefit the new residents. This second "rational
nexus" requirement is met if local government can demonstrate
that its actual or projected extra-development capital expenditures
earmarked for the substantial benefit of a series of developments,
are greater than the capital payments required of those develop-
ments. 71 The Dunedin decision thus indicates that an impact fee
67. Id. "Raising expansion capital by setting connection charges, which do not exceed
a pro rata share of reasonably anticipated costs of expansion, is permissible where expansion
is reasonably required, if use of the money collected is limited to meeting the costs of expan-
sion." Id. at 320. "Users who benefit especially, not from the maintenance of the system, but
by the extension of the system . . . should bear the cost of that extension." Id.
68. Id. at 318.
69. Id. at 320 n.10.
70. Id. at 321. The requirement that publicly collected funds have appropriate restric-
tions on the use of such funds is commonly referred to as "earmarking."
71. This reasonableness test is similar to the two-part rational nexus test of reasona-
bleness adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls,
137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965). The Jordan court addressed the constitutionality of in lieu fees
for educational and recreational purposes. The court held that money payment and dedica-
tion rquirements for educational and recreational purposes were a valid exercise of the po-
lice power if there was a "reasonable" connection between the need for additional facilities
and the growth generated by the subdivision. The first rational nexus was sufficiently estab-
lished if the local government could demonstrate that the new subdivision had generated
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which meets the flexible dual rational nexus tests should not sum-
marily be labelled a tax.
Since the Supreme Court of Florida handed down its decision
in Dunedin, the pressures which created the interest of local gov-
ernments in enacting such fees have greatly increased and more
local governments have pursued and embraced the concept. Fortu-
nately for governments, a subsequent opinion in the Dunedin con-
troversy and three 1983 Florida District Court of Appeals opinions
extend the permissible uses of local government impact fees. These
cases clarify the standards to be applied in determining the valid-
ity of impact fees.
The litigants in Dunedin "revisited" the Second District Court
of Appeal shortly following the Florida Supremie Court's decision. 2
The trial court on remand had found that the defects in "earmark-
ing" had been cured by the city but ordered a refund of the fees
already paid.73 The Second District Court of Appeal reversed,
thereby preventing developers from obtaining refunds .7 Although
the holding of the court applies to a rather unique situation, the
decision is quite significant because of the pro-impact fee position
taken by the court.
The 1983 decisions are of much greater significance. In decid-
ing the three cases, the courts in two major urbanizing appellate
districts clarified the authority of local governments to enact such
fees under their police power authority, and adopted the "reasona-
ble nexus" tests first established in Dunedin. Due to the great sig-
nificance of these cases, each will be analyzed in considerable
detail.
the need to provide educational and recreational facilities for the benefit of new residents.
The second rational nexus "sufficient benefit" test was met if the fees were to be used exclu-
sively for site acquisition and the amount spent by the village in constructing additional
facilities was greater than the amounts collected from the development creating the need for
additional facilities.
72. City of Dunedin v. Contractors and Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County, 358 So. 2d
846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458 (Fla.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867
(1979).
73. Id. at 848.
74. Id. "There is no question that a municipality may now impose 'impact fees.'" Id.
the City has followed the direction of the supreme court explicitly. It has specifically
earmarked the impact funds for the water and sewer system expansion." Id.
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Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County75 involved a fee required
to be paid to the county as a condition of plan approval. This fee
was required of subdivisions in incorporated or unincorporated ar-
eas of Broward County to be used for the capital costs of ex-
panding the countywide park system. Under the challenged ordi-
nance, a subdivider has the option (with the agreement of the
county) of dedicating land, paying a fee-in-lieu of dedicating land,
or paying an impact fee determined by a schedule based on the
number and size of dwelling units to be built.
7 6
The court first addressed the authority by which Broward
County adopted the ordinance. Hollywood, Inc. asserted the act
was ultra vires or beyond the constitutional or statutory powers of
the county." The court noted that Broward County is a charter
county which, under the Florida Constitution, maintains broad
home rule powers, and whose powers are to be broadly construed
by the terms of the charter itself. The court found nothing in the
county charter which would prohibit the enacted ordinance. 8
The court then turned79 to the allegation that the ordinance
was unconstitutional because it constituted a taking without just
compensation and established an invalid tax. Under the standards
established by Dunedin, and authority from other state decisions,
the court found the ordinance to be a valid exercise of the police
power.80 Impact fees or dedication requirements are permissible,
75. 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla.
1983).
76. Id. at 607-08.
77. Id. at 608.
78. Id. at 609-10.
79. Id. at 610 n.3. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text for a brief discussion
on the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act.
80. Id. at 610-13. The court, expressly relying upon Constractors & Builders Ass'n of
Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976), Wald Corporation v. Metro-
politan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 955
(Fla. 1977), and Admiral Development Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1972), stated:
From the City of Dunedin, Wald, and Admiral Development , we discern the
general legal principle that reasonable dedication or impact fee requirements are
permissible so long as they offset needs sufficiently attributable to the subdivision
and so long as the funds collected are sufficiently earmarked for the substantial
benefit of the subdivision residents. In order to satisfy these requirements, the
local government must demonstrate a reasonable connection, or rational nexus,
between the need for additional capital facilities and the growth in population
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the court found, if they show a "reasonable connection" or "ra-
tional nexus" in two ways: (1) the fees offset needs sufficiently at-
tributable to the growth in population generated by the subdivi-
sion; and (2) the funds collected are sufficiently earmarked for the
substantial benefit of the subdivision residents.81 By adhering to
these two tests, "local governments can shift to new residents the
reasonable capital costs incurred on their account." 2
Broward County met the two tests for a valid impact fee in
the several ways. First, the growth generated by the new subdivi-
sions would require new parks for the county to maintain its stan-
dard of three acres per 1,000 residents, a standard which is not
unreasonably high and is perhaps low. The county had provided
parks for existing residents through various methods such as a
bond issue. The fees collected from the new residents would not
exceed the costs of providing capital park facilities for the new res-
idents, even after those residents are credited for their future
property tax payments for the bond retirement.83 Second, the
funds, by the terms of the ordinance, were earmarked to be ex-
pended "within a reasonable period of time," for the acquisition
and developing parks within a reasonable distance of the subdivi-
sion (fifteen miles).84 As a final note, the court declared that "open
generated by the subdivision. In addition, the government must show a reasonable
connection, or rational nexus, between the expenditures of the funds collected and
the benefits accruing to the subdivision. In order to satisfy this latter requirement,
the ordinance must specifically earmark the funds collected for use in acquiring
capital facilities to benefit the new residents. The developer, of course, can at-
tempt to refute the government's showing by offering additional evidence.
431 So. 2d at 611-12.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 611.
83. Id. at 612. The county had a $73 million bond issued to meet the current popula-
tion's needs. Id.
84. Section 5-192-(e) of the Broward County Code, a common example of a parks and
recreational impact fee ordinance, provides in pertinent part that the developer shall
c. Agree to deposit in a non-lapsing Trust Fund established and
maintained by the County an amount of money as set forth in the sched-
ule below for each dwelling unit to be constructed within the platted
area. Such amounts shall be deposited prior to the issuance of a building
permit for the construction of each dwelling unit. From the effective date
of this Ordinance until September 30, 1978, the amount of money to be
deposited for each dwelling unit to be constructed shall be as follows and
for each fiscal year thereafter shall be increased by six percent (6%)
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space, green parks and adequate recreational areas are vital to a
community's mental and physical well being," and as such the or-
dinance insuring parks and recreational facilities "falls squarely
within the state's police powers .... 85
Town of Longboat Key v. Lands End, Ltd.,86 concerned an or-
dinance requiring developers to deed land or pay a fee, before final
approval of development plans, for acquiring open space and park
land. The ordinance originally provided that developers would
dedicate 1-1/2 acres per 1,000 residents of the development or an
equivalent amount of money in lieu of the land for parks and open
space and another 2-1/ acres for "other specified town purposes. '87
Before the end of the trial, the town amended its ordinance to re-
quire five acres of land per 1,000 residents or a fee-in-lieu, and de-
leted the reference to "other specified town purposes. "88 The trial
compounded on an annual basis. Sixty dollars ($60.00) for each dwelling
unit with up to one (1) bedroom. Eighty-five dollars ($85.00) for each
dwelling unit with two (2) bedrooms. One hundred twenty-five dollars
($125.00) for each dwelling unit with three (3) or more bedrooms.
(3) The county commission shall establish an effective program
for the acquisition of lands for development as regional, subregional and
urban parks in order to meet, within a reasonable period of time, the
existing need for county level parks, and to meet, as it occurs, the need
for county level parks which will be created by further residential devel-
opments constructed after the effective date of this Ordinance. The an-
nual budget and capital program of the County shall provide for appro-
priation of funds as may be necessary to carry out the County's program
for the acquisition of land for county level parks. The funds necessary to
acquire lands to meet the existing need for county level parks must be
provided from a source of revenue other than from the amounts depos-
ited in the Trust Fund. Such amounts shall be expended within a reason-
able period of time, for the purpose of acquiring and developing land
necessary to meet the need for county level parks created by the develop-
ment in order to provide a system of county level parks which will be
available to and substantially benefit the residents of the platted area. If
a proposed plat is approved by the County Commission and recorded in
the Official records after the effective date of this Ordinance then the
developer shall be exempted from any provisions in the County Land
Use Plan requiring the payment of impact fees for the purpose of provid-
ing funds for the acquisition of land for county level parks.
85. 431 So. 2d at 614.
86. 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
87. Id. at 576.
88. Id.
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court invalidated the first ordinance, finding it to establish an in-
valid tax on the basis that reference to "other specified town pur-
poses" indicated that the fees were not properly restricted to park
development.89
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded
the case to the trial court to apply the later enacted ordinance.9 0 In
so doing, the district court adopted the tests established in the
Hollywood, Inc. case, and thus provided guidance regarding the
evaluation of the later enacted ordinance.9 " The court specifically
referred to the two rational nexus tests and stated that the fees
must be shown to offset, but not exceed reasonable needs attribu-
table to the new subdivision residents, and must be adequately
earmarked for capital assets that will sufficiently benefit the new
residents.2
In Home Builders and Contractors Ass'n. v. Palm Beach
County," a case decided seven months after Hollywood, Inc., the
Fourth District Court of Appeal again upheld the use of impact
fees that meet the two rational nexus tests, in this case, for a non-
charter county and for the use of road improvements. The Palm
Beach County ordinance required "new land development activity
generating road traffic" (including residential, commercial, and in-
dustrial uses) to pay a "fair share" of the cost of expanding new
roads attributable to the new development.9 4 The developer may
pay according to a formula in the ordinance that is based on the
costs of road construction and the number of motor vehicle trips
generated by different types of land use.95 Alternatively, a devel-
89. Id at 575.
90. Id. at 576. The court indicated that the trial court on remand should scrutinize
"that portion of the ordinance which establishes the land and fee requirements in order to
determine whether a proper nexus exists between the amount of land or money to be set
aside and the stated residential population requirements." Id.
91. Id. The court quoted Hollywood, Inc., holding that such impact fees "are permissi-
ble so long as ... the exactions are shown to offset, but not exceed, reasonable needs suffi-
ciently attributable to the new subdivision residents and... the funds collected are ade-
quately earmarked for the acquisition of capital assets that will sufficiently benefit those
new residents." Hollywood Inc., 431 So. 2d at 614.
92. Town of Longboat Key, 433 So. 2d at 576.
93. 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 451 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1983).
94. Id. at 141.
95. Id. at 142. The formula provides for a fee of $300.00 per uriit for single family
houses, $200.00 per unit for multi-family homes, and $175.00 per unit for mobile homes. Id.
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oper may submit his own study of his fair share of the road costs.
Funds collected are placed in a trust fund for expenditure in one of
forty zones established throughout the county in which the devel-
opment is located.9'
Following the same line of reasoning as Hollywood, Inc., the
court first addressed the county's authority to enact the ordi-
nance.17 The court looked to the article VIII, section 1(f) of the
Florida Constitution, which grants non-charter counties "such
power of self-government as provided by special or general law."'
The court found that Chapter 125, the County Government Stat-
ute, provides sufficient statutory authority for impact fees in light
of the Florida Supreme Court decision of Speer v. Olsen.9 The
Spear decision interpreted the statute to be a grant of broad home
rule power to non-charter counties in the absence of inconsistent
general or special laws.100 The Home Builders court also found
statutory authority for impact fees in the Local Government Com-
prehensive Planning Act.101
The court rejected the Home Builders' argument that the or-
dinance violated the constitutional equal protection provisions be-
cause in a non-charter county, municipalities may "opt out" of the
ordinance.10 2 Noting that the Florida Constitution provides that
municipalities in non-charter counties may opt out, the court de-
cided that unequal or different charges are not improper where the
legislation is otherwise a valid exercise of governmental power. 0 3
Finally, the court found that the ordinance meets the require-
ments to be a valid fee, rather than a tax, because of the restric-
tions built into the assessment and use of a fee.'" The dichotomy
between a fee and tax, the court conceded, is "the most difficult
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. In Speer v. Olsen, 367 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1979) the Florida Supreme Court indi-
cated that the intent of Florida Legislature in enacting Chapter 125 "was to enlarge the
powers of counties through home rule to govern themselves." 367 So. 2d at 210-11. See also
FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1) (1975).
100. Home Builders, 446 So. 2d at 142.
101. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3161 (Supp. 1985).
102. 446 So. 2d at 144.
103. Id. See FLA. CONST. Art. VIII, § l(f).
104. 446 So. 2d at 144.
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point raised in this appeal," because "the distinction is very amor-
phous." 105 The court referred to the public policy factors that
should be used to characterize impact fees as regulatory rather
than taxing devices, including the legislative mandate that local
governments must plan comprehensively for future growth, by
quoting the following from Juergensmeyer and Blake, Impact
Fees: An Answer to Local Governments' Capital Funding
Dilemma,:
The appropriate framework for determining whether an impact fee
is a regulation or a tax is one of public policy in which a number of fac-
tors should be weighed. The home rule powers granted local governments
in Florida, the legislative mandate that local governments must plan
comprehensively for future growth, and the additional broad powers
given them-to make those plans work effectively, indicate that properly
limited impact fees for educational or recreational purposes should be
construed as regulations. Characterization as a regulation is particularly
appropriate where an impact fee is used to complement other land use
measures such as in lieu fees or dedications. If an impact fee is character-
ized as a regulation, its validity should then be determined by reference
to the dual rational nexi police power standard.'"
The Palm Beach ordinance specifically met the Dunedin tests
for a valid regulatory fee because the ordinance recognized that
county growth requires increased road capacity, for which the cost
of providing will far exceed the fees imposed by the ordinance.107
Significantly, the court held that the improvements paid for by the
impact fees need not be used exclusively or overwhelmingly for
those who pay, rather improvements need only to "adequately ben-
efit" the development which provides the fee. 08 The rejection of
an "exclusive benefit" criterion explicitly puts the court with a
growing number of states that accept a more flexible use of such
fees so long as they bear a reasonable relationship to the needs
created by the subdivision.109
105. Id.
106. Id. at 145. See Juergensmeyer and Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local Gov-
ernments' Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 415, 440-41 (1981).
107. 446 So. 2d at 145.
108. Id. at 143-44 ". . . benefit accurring to the community generally does not ad-
versely affect the validity of a development regulation ordinance as long as the fee does not
exceed the cost of the improvements required by the new development and the improve-
ments adequately benefit the development which is the source of the fee."
109. See, e.g., Associated Homebuilders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut
Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971); Ayers v. City Council of Los
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The three 1983 opinions show a clear decision by the Florida
courts to uphold impact fees against the claim that such fees are
invalid taxes and/or are unauthorized by statute. In both a charter
and non-charter county, as well as in a city, the courts found suffi-
cient authority in the constitutional and statutory "home rule"
powers of local governments to enact the fees. In Home Builders,
the Fourth District Court of Appeal also found sufficient authority
for impact fees in the Local Government Comprehensive Planning
Act. The decisions show a recognition of the public policy argu-
ments in favor of impact fees, as the courts essentially abandon the
semantic distinctions between "fees" and "taxes."
The validity of the fees as recognized by these cases, is not
properly judged by how the fees are assessed, but rather how they
are spent. The cases adopt the dual rational nexus tests as origi-
nally set forward in the Dunedin case. These tests require that a
local government demonstrate that the need for the fee is created
by the new growth (and the fee does not exceed the cost of the new
growth) and that the funds collected are earmarked for the suffi-
cient benefit of the new residents. At the same time, the courts
have not looked closely at the exact methodology by which the
tests are met. For example, the Palm Beach County zone system
was sufficient, as was the Broward County proof of park usage pat-
terns, to show that new residents would be sufficiently benefitted
by the fees. The cases also assume that the funds can be spent on
land acquisition as well as capital facilities, ignoring possible dis-
tinctions between fees-in-lieu of dedication and capital facilities
charges. Fees can be collected for water and sewer (Dunedin),
parks (Hollywood, Inc. and Town of Longboat Key) and roads
(Home Builders). The courts attempt no distinction between so-
called "proprietary" versus "general government" functions, al-
though such arguments were made in the appeals of the cases.
Thus, the recent decisions give a green light to local government
use of carefully drafted impact fees for a variety of purposes.
Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County,
394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964); Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) on reh'g,
614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980) (Supreme Court of Utah held that it was not necessary that fees
paid be used solely for the benefit of the subdivision in question; it is sufficient if the fees
imposed bear a reasonable relationship to the needs created by the subdivision).
1984/851 725
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
E. Conclusion
In light of the Florida decisions, a farmland preservation im-
pact fee in Florida should be judicially acceptable, provided it
shows a reasonable connection or rational nexus in two ways: (1)
the fees offset needs sufficiently attributable to new developments
that convert agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses; and (2) the
funds collected, for farmland preservation programs are adequately
earmarked for the sufficient benefit of the new development resi-
dents. If the impact fees are successfully collected the most appro-
priate use of those funds would be the purchase of development
rights or agricultural conservation easements. These rights or ease-
ments would serve to restrict land to agricultural use and at the
same time inject money into the farm operation to economically
preserve the agricultural operation. Perhaps in many areas, the
purchase would be compulsory thereby restricting the farmland to
agricultural use only whether or not such is the desire of the land-
owner. The effect would be similar to that of an exclusive agricul-
tural zoning plan. However, the important difference is that the
landowner's economic loss would be voluntarily compensated or at
least mitigated by the payment received for the development
rights or the agricultural conservation easement. The format of
such a compulsory purchase of development rights or agricultural
conservation easement program has been discussed elsewhere and
need not be repeated. 110 The only thing innovative about the cur-
rent proposal is total or partial funding of such a program through
an agricultural lands preservation impact fee.
Is this proposal too radical for consideration? Perhaps, but in
its defense, let it be remembered that no use of general tax reve-
nues is called for. Real property ownership rights are protected by
mitigation of loss payments when the economic value of such
rights are restricted, and one of the economic impacts of new de-
velopment is placed, not on society in general or farmers in partic-
ular, but on those landowners and developers that reap the eco-
nomic profits from new development. Is not the current system
110. See Freilich, Saving the Land: The Utilization of Modern Techniques of Growth
Management to Preserve Rural and Agricultural America, 13 URB. L. 27, 42 (1981); Torres,
Helping Farmers Saving Farmland, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 31 (1984); Comment, "Right to Farm"
Statutes - The Newest Tool in Agricultural Land Preservation, 10 FLA. ST. UL. REV. 415,
419-42 (1982).
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which forces land into continued agricultural use without mitiga-
tion of economic loss and/or deprives governments and their con-
stituencies of economically viable farmland preservation programs
the truly radical and unacceptable approach to a farmland preser-
vation crisis?

